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A propositional version of Feldman and Harel's PrDL (1982, "14th ACM Sym- 
pos. on Theory of Computing," pp. 181-195; J. Comput, System Sci. 28, No. 2 
(1984), 193-215) is defined, and shown to be decidable in double-exponential space. 
The logic allows propositional-level formulas involving probabilistic programs, and 
contains the full (quantified) real-number theory for dealing with probabilities. The 
decidability proof introduces a succession of abstractions of the notion of a model, 
from the full generality of measure theoretical models, down to the finite schematic 
models, which seem to be the most basic structures relating programs and 
probabilities. © 1984 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the recent popularity of probabilistic algorithms for solving 
problems which are otherwise hard or even unsolvable, some attention has 
been given to the formalization of correctness proof methods for 
probabilistic programs. Perhaps the first step in this direction is Kozen's 
definition of a formal semantics for such programs (Kozen, 1979). The next 
step would be a formal programming logic for probabilistic programs, and 
several systems have indeed been proposed. On a first-order (or higher 
order) level are Ramshaw's frequency system (Ramshaw, 1981), a semi-for- 
mal system based on the Floyd-Hoare inductive assertion method, and 
Feldman and Harel's PrDL (Feldman and Hard, 1982; Feldman, 1984). 
The latter is a powerful logical system which is shown there to admit a 
complete axiomatization relative to the underlying program-free 
probabilistic language. Unfortunately, the underlying theory itself is highly 
undecidable (equivalent to second-order arithmetic in the discrete case). 
Feldman (1984) contains a detailed explanation of why we believe this to 
be characteristic of any logic powerful enough to express interesting first- 
order properties of probabilistic programs, and the fact that no other such 
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first-order logics have been suggested seems to corroborate this feeling. 
Thus it seems desirable to have a further abstraction in the form of a 
programming logic on the propositional evel for reasoning about 
probabilistic programs; a major requirement from such a propositional 
logic is decidability of its validity problem. 
Proposals for such propositional logics are Reif's (1980) PROB-DL, 
Makowsky and Tiomkin's (1983) PPDL, and Lehmann and Shelah's 
(1983) and Hart and Sharir's (1983) probabilistic temporal logics. 
However, in Lehmann and Shelah (1983) and Hart and Sharir (1983) 
programs do not appear explicitly at all, while in Reif (1980) the program- 
ming language is not natural and, in particular, contains no deterministic 
branching construct. In all systems probabilities appear as constants: 
rational numbers in Reif (1980), 0 or 1 in Lehmann and Shelah (1983). 
Makowsky and Tiomkin (1983) present an infinitary logic with a complete 
axiomatization; however, the logic is not decidable (or even countable), 
and three finitary versions of the logic are shown in Makowsky and 
Tiomkin (1983) be undecidable, and, moreover, not recursively 
axiomatizable. 
Kozen's (1983) contains a different approach to probabilistic program- 
ming logics, which nevertheless i  quite similar in parts to this work. In 
expressive power (though not in general spirit) the well-structured part of 
his system (which is the only part shown to be decidable) is in fact sub- 
sumed by the logic presented here, as shown by Theorem 2. 
In this paper we define a propositional version P-PrDL of Feldman and 
Harel's PrDL which preserves many of the powerful characteristics of that 
logic, such as the ability to use the full power of first-order eal-number 
theory for dealing with probabilities, and deterministic regular programs as 
in SDPDL (Halpern and Reif, 1981), while still being decidable. The 
decidability proof, which is nontrivial, introduces a succession of abstrac- 
tions from the most general notion of a measure-theoretic model down to 
schematic models, which seem to be the most basic structures relating 
programs and probabilities, and ultimately reduces the validity problem to 
truth in first-order eal-number theory, proven to be decidable by Tarski 
(1948). 
Section 2 of the paper defines the syntax of the language, Section 3 
defines the semantics, and Section 4 contains some examples and dis- 
cussion. Section 5 presents the decidability proof, and Section 6 contains a 
conclusion and discusses possible future work. 
2. THE SYNTAX 
The first-order version PrDL contains two types of variables: program 
variables range over the domain of computation, and appear in programs 
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and events; global variables range over the domain of analysis, and are thus 
real-valued, since they are used to discuss probabilities. 
In P-PrDL, programs and events are propositional, and therefore there 
is no need for program variables. P-PrDL does contain the real-valued 
global variables, but uses as the underlying theory the decidable real-num- 
ber theory rather than the highly-undecidable first-order analysis. (The for- 
mal difference between the two is the absence of any means for identifying 
the integers in the former logic. See Rogers, 1967, for details.) 
Let q~o be the set of atomic events, which will be informally represented 
by p, q ..... and let/7o be the set of atomic programs, informally represented 
by a, b,.... The set ~b of events is the smallest set containing the atomic 
events as well as the events -nP and (P v Q) for any events P and Q. 
We shall use a ,  - ,  D, true, and false as abbreviations in the usual way, 
and drop parentheses whenever convenient. 
The set H of programs is the smallest set containing the atomic 
programs, the special program SKIP, and the programs (e; fl), (if P then c~ 
else fi) and (while P do e) for any programs c~ and/7 and event P. Given an 
event P, the program which does nothing when P is true and diverges when 
P is false is while -1P do SKIP. This program will be called a guard, and 
abbreviated to P!. 
Terms in the language are composed of first-order terms from real-num- 
ber theory and frequencies, corresponding to unnormalized probabilities. 
(This is essential for the proper handling of non-termination, since that 
information is lost in normalization. See Feldman and Harel, 1982; Kozen, 
1979; Ramshaw, 1981.) The set T of terms is the smallest set containing 
0, 1, xi for all natural i, Fr(P) for any event P, and - s ,  (s + t), and (s- t) 
for any terms s and t. 
We shall use Pr(P) as an abbreviation for Fr(P)/Fr(true) (or 0 if the 
denominator vanishes), which in essence normalizes the measure Fr(P) to 
a probability measure. More formally, we write Pr (P)= x instead of 
(Fr(true) ¢ 0 ~ x .  Fr(true) = Fr(P)) A (Fr(true) = 0 ~ x = 0). 
Finally, formulas of P-PrDL are first-order combinations of terms, 
qualified by programs. The set O of formulas is the smallest set containing 
(s=t)  and (s<t)  for any terms s and t, and 7P ,  (P v Q), (3xiP) and 
({~}P) for any formulas P and Q, program c¢ and natural i. The intended 
meaning of the construct {e}P is: "P will be true after execution of c~." 
Again we use A, --, D, V, true, and false as abbreviations in the usual 
way, and drop inessential parentheses. 
At this point we wish to extend the syntax of P-PrDL somewhat, by 
allowing terms of the form Fr({e}P) for an event P, representing the fre- 
quency of P after execution of e in the current state. This can be translated 
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back into "standard" P-PrDL by replacing the term with a new variable x, 
adding a conjunct {~} Fr (P)= x to the innermost subformula containing 
the term and quantifying that subformula existentially over x. Further- 
more, we will understand Fr({~} {fi}P) to mean Fr({c~; fl}P), and {c~}t for 
a term t to mean t with all Fr(P) subterms replaced by Fr({a}P). 
While this extension does not change the expressive power of the 
language, it simplifies the notation and brings it closer to the arithmetic 
approach advocated by Kozen (1983). In fact, the truth-functional 
approach does not contradict the arithmetic approach but rather subsumes 
it, as is shown in Section 4. Note that using this notation it is always valid 
that ({c~} Fr (P )=x) - (F r ({a}P)=x) .  Examples of valid formulas are 
presented in Section 4. 
3. THE SEMANTICS 
The semantics of P-PrDL is a direct adaptation of that of PrDL 
(Feldman and Harel, 1982) for propositional events and programs.' A
model for P-PrDL is a structure 
d/t = ( D, d ,  ~, p, V ), 
where: 
D is an arbitrary non-empty domain; 
~' is a a-algebra of subsets of D; 
r: ~o ~ d is a mapping assigning to every atomic event a measurable 
subset of D. 
Let M be the set of all finite positive measures on the space (D, d ) .  
Elements of M will be called states: 
p: Ho~ (M~M)  is a mapping assigning to every atomic program a 
weakly-continuous linear mapping from M into M which is non-increasing, 
in the sense that p(et)(#)(D)~< #(D) for all/~ E M; 
V assigns a real number to every variable xi. 
Given a model ~ as above, the semantics is defined in the following 
way: First, ~ is extended to all of ~ by letting 
• ~( -1P)=D-~(P) ,  and 
• z(P v Q) = z(P) u r (Q) .  
Clearly this conserves measurability. 
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Next, p is extended to all of H; this is a straightforward application of 
Kozen's (1979) semantics: 
• p(SKIP) = IM, the identity on M; 
• p(~;fl)=p(fl)op(~); 
• p(if P then ~ else fl)=p(a)oe~(p)+p(fl)oe~(~p), 
where eB is the map taking # to #B such that/~B(A) =/~(A • B), i.e.,/~n is 0 
outside of B. 
• p(while P do o~)=~;'~=oe~(~p)o(p(o:)oe~(p)) k. 
Applying these definitions to P! we get p(P!)= e~(p). This means that the 
program P! eliminates all mass which does not satisfy P; it changes a 
probability measure to the unnormalized conditional probability Pr(. [ P), 
decreasing the total mass to Fr(P). 
It is a consequence of Kozen (1979) that p(a) is a weakly-continuous 
linear non-increasing mapping as defined earlier. (See also Kozen, 1983.) 
The meaning of a term t will be a function U*(t): M- ,  R, defined as 
follows: 
• U*(0)-=0, U*(1)-=1; 
• U*(x l ) -  V(xi); 
(the above are all constant functions) 
• U*(Fr(P))(bt)=/~(z(P)), i.e., Fr(P) evaluated at the state # is the 
measure under/~ of the meaning of P; 
• u* ( - s ) - -U* (s ) ;  
• U*(s + t ) -  U*(s) + u*(t); 
• U*(s ' t ) -  U*(s)" U*(t). 
Finally, the semantics of formulas are defined by specifying when a state 
/~ satisfies a formula P, written as all, #~P,  or simply #~P when the 
model is understood from the context: 
• /~Ns= t iff U*(s)(lO = U*(t)(#); 
• ¢t~s < t iff U*(s)(#) < U*(t)(~); 
• /~P  iff/~ ~ P; 
• #~P v Q i f f / z~e or /~Q;  
• #~3x,  P iffthere is a real number such that J/ l[x]r], #~P,  i.e.,/~ 
satisfies P in the model resulting from replacing V(x~) by r in ~';  
• #~ {~}P iff p(~)(/z)~P, i.e., {~}P is true at/~ if P is true at the 
state derived from # by executing the program ~. 
643/63/1/2-2 
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Given a formula P, let pv be its universal closure, i.e., P with all free 
global variables universally quantified. 
DEFINITION 1. A formula P is said to be ./~l-valid, written J /~P ,  if 
J//l, #~pV holds for every/~ in J//; it is valid if it is J/g-valid in every model 
~/~; it is satisfiable if its negation is not valid. 
4. EXAMPLES AND DISCUSSION 
The following are valid formulas: 
~ Fr( true ) -- x D {c~} Fr( true ) <<. x. (1) 
This expresses the fact that programs cannot increase the total probabilistic 
mass. 
({ a } Pr(q) = x) -= ( {if p then a else a } Pr(q) = x). 
~ ({while p do (a; p[; a)} Fr(q) = x 
A {p!; a; while p do (a; p!; a)} Fr(q)= y) 
{while p do a} Fr(q) = x + y. 
This expresses the semantic fact that 
e~(~P)°(P(°Q°e~(e)) 2k + ~" e~(~v)o(p(o~)oe~(e)) 2k+1 
k=0 k=0 
= ~ e~(= e) o (p(cQ o e:(e)) k. 
k=O 
(2) 
(3) 
The following valid schemes might be used as axioms in an axiomatic 
deduction system for P-PrDL; most are taken from PrDL: 
A1. ({c~}P)-P for a formula P containing no occurrences of Fr; 
A2. {c~}(P v Q)~ {c~}P v {~}Q; 
A3. {a}qP-= -n {~}P; 
A4. {c~} 3x,V= 3x;{c~}P; 
A5. {cq/~}P- {c~} {fl}P; 
A6. {if P then ~ else/~} Fr(Q) = x 
= 3y({PI;c~}Fr(Q) = y/x {-1P!;/?} Fr(Q) = x-y ) ;  
a7. {P I}Fr (Q)=x =- Fr(PA Q)=x;  
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A8. {while P do a}P--- {if P then (a; while P do ~) else SKIP}P; 
A9. ({SKIP}P)=-P. 
As examples of the extended notation of Section 2 as well as of Theorem 
2 below, we translate some of Kozen's "basic properties" FKozen, 1983, 
Sect. 4], for well-structured programs, into P-PrDL (note that (4), (6), and 
(7) are equivalent to A7, A6, and A8, respectively): 
Fr({P!}Q) = Fr(P ^  Q); (4) 
Fr(P) ~< Fr(Q) 
Fr({~ }e) ~< Fr({~}Q); (5) 
Fr({if P then ~ else fl}Q)= Fr({P!; ~}Q)+ Fr({~P!; ~}Q); (6) 
Fr({while P do ~}O)= Fr(-qP A Q)+ Fr({P!; ~; while P do ~}Q); (7) 
Fr(--q P ^ R) + Fr({P!; ~}O) ~< Fr(Q) 
Fr( {while P do o~}R)~< Fr(Q) (8) 
The validity of this rule stems from the fact that at state p(while P 
do ct)(#) the meaning of Fr(R) is 
p((e!; ~)"; -~P!)(u)(¢(R)) 
n=O 
= ~ p((P!; ~)')(#)(v(TP ^R)) 
rt=O 
n=O 
=~(t(Q)). 
(p((P!; a)")(#)(v(Q)) - p((P!; a)"+ 1)(#)(t(Q))) 
(The inequality is justified by the assumption of the rule.) This last rule, 
translated into "standard" P-PrDL, would read 
{P!;~} Fr(Q) = v ~ Fr(-TP/x R)+v<~Fr(Q) 
Fr(Q) = u = {while P do a} Fr(R) ~< u 
The question of whether the axioms and rules given here suffice for com- 
pleteness i still open. 
As was mentioned in Section 1, Kozen's (1983) presents a different 
approach to probabilistic programming logics. It defines an "arithmetical" 
system called PPDL. Although the syntax of PPDL is superficially very dif- 
ferent form that of P-PrDL, the semantics of the two systems are 
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equivalent, even to the point of using the same models, with two excep- 
tions: (a) PPDL requires atomic programs to be total, whereas P-PrDL 
does not; and (b) initial states in PPDL, but not in P-PrDL, are assumed 
to have a total mass of 1. A consequence of the first difference is that, while 
any atomic program in P-PrDL can be consistently replaced by a com- 
pound program, preserving validity, the same is not true for PPDL. 
The definition of PPDL is certainly elegant, and Kozen makes a case for 
working with the general (but not well-structured) a* construct. However, 
the main result for PPDL, namely, a polynomial-space d cision procedure, 
is available for formulas involving well-structured programs only. The 
decidability part of this result (though not the complexity bound) follows 
from the decidability of P-PrDL, since the well-structured part of PPDL is 
reducible to P-PrDL. This is seen by the following theorem: 
THEOREM 2. Let tilt be a model for PPDL and ~o a formula of well-struc- 
tured PPDL. There exists a formula (o of P-PrDL such that J / t~o  in 
PPDL if and only if Jg~Fr( t rue)= 1 D (o in P-PrDL. The translation ~o ~ (o 
is effective. 
Note that since satisfiability in PPDL is only definable for a model, and 
since PPDL does not contain probabilistic states, we must settle for Jg- 
validity in the statement of the theorem. 
Proof The proof will construct an analogue 0 for every element 0of the 
language of PPDL. All constructions will be effective. For convenience we 
slightly rearrange Kozen's definitions: 
Atomic measurable functions are taken as atomic events, and 
propositions are translated into compound events: i = true, and the 
operations /~ and -1 remain unchanged. 
Programs (assumed to be well-structured) remain the same, except hat 
skip = SKIP, and fail = false!. 
Functions are translated into terms: a proposition P appearing as a 
function is translated into Fr(P); r f+sg-=rf+sg;  P ' f={P!} f ;  and 
(~ >f= {~}f (We are using the extended efinitions of Section 2,) 
Finally, a formula f ~< g is translated into f ~< ~. 
Since the semantics are equivalent ( he two exceptions mentioned above 
do not apply here, the first since J¢ is a PPDL model, and the second 
because of the antecedent Fr(true) = 1 ), the theorem easily follows. The for- 
mal proof proceeds by showing that programs in each case represent 
equivalent transformations (this is done in Kozen, 1983); that the set 
whose characteristic function is the proposition P is exactly the meaning of 
the event _P; and that the function f in PPDL on a point d has the same 
value as the P-PrDL term f on a unit mass concentrated at d. | 
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The only change needed in the decidability proof of P-PrDL in order to 
make it applicable to PPDL is to force atomic programs to be total; this is 
done by changing the appropriate inequalities into equalities. This now 
provides a proof of the decidability of well-structured PPDL augmented to 
include real-number theory and all first-order combinations of measurable- 
function terms. 
The correspondence works the other way as well: P-PrDL can be made 
to include PPDL programs, most notably the linear combination re + sfl 
and generalized iteration e*, and the same translation would reduce full 
PPDL to the extended la-PrDL. However, nothing is currently known 
about the decidability of either system. 
5. DECIDABILITY 
The main part of this section is devoted to the proof of the decidability 
of the validity problem for P-PrDL. Sections 5.1 through 5.4 describe a 
decision procedure for deciding satisfiability of a P-PrDL formula. The 
validity of P is of course checked by testing for the non-satisfiability of -7 P. 
Throughout we assume that a fixed P-PrDL formula P is given, and we 
want to decide whether P is satisfiable. 
Section 5.1 describes countable structures, called tree models, which 
represent all relevant parts of a model satisfying P, if one exists. Section 5.2 
contains the first step towards finite representations of models, in the form 
of a finite description of execution sequences by signatures. This is sufficient 
for completing the proof for the special case where P contains a single 
atomic program; this is done in Section 5.3. This proof is then generalized 
in Section 5.4 to apply to any P-PrDL formula. Section 5.5 gives lower and 
upper bounds on the complexity of the decision procedure. Section 5.6 con- 
cludes by showing that the inference problem for P-PrDL is H~-hard. 
5.1. Countable Representations---Tree Models 
In this section the general measure-theoretic notion of a model is 
replaced by countable (discrete) structures. First we define a technical but 
useful concept: 
DEFINITION 3. A formula of P-PrDL is said to be in standard form if it 
is a first-order combination of atomic predicates and formulas of the simple 
form {e} Fr(true)=x, and if all frequency terms are qualified by some 
program. 
LEMMA 4. Every formula of P-PrDL has a logically-equivalent formula 
in standard form. 
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Proof The first step is to change all occurrences of Fr to be of the sim- 
ple form Fr (P)= x for a variable x. This is accomplished by introducing 
new existentially quantified variables; e.g., F r (P)=Fr(Q)  is replaced by 
3x(Fr (P )=x  ^  Fr(Q)=x).  Next, all programs are "pushed" down over 
negations, disjunctions, and quantifiers, so that programs appear only in 
formulas of the form {51}''" {~k) Fr (P)=x,  or equivalently, 
{~l;. . . ;~k}Fr(P)=x. Finally, {~}Fr (P )=x should be replaced by 
{~; P!} Fr(true)= x, and all unqualified frequency terms are qualified by 
{SKIP}. The resulting formula is in standard form and is clearly equivalent 
to the original formula. (Cf. axioms A2-A5, A7, and A9.) | 
Since the above transformations are effective, we can assume without 
loss of generality that P is in standard form. Assume therefore that P is a 
first-order combination of the formulas (c~i} Fr(true) = xi for 1 ~< i ~< m, and 
denote the atomic events and programs in P by Pl,---, P~ and al,..., at, 
respectively. We can further assume without loss of generality that 
~bo= {Pl ..... Pk} and //0 = {al ..... at}. Let 7 j be the set of all atoms over 
Pl,---, P,, i.e., all formulas of the form /~=1 +Pi,  where _+p; is Pi or its 
negation. Now let B be the regular set of strings (~UH0)*~. Every string 
= Qi0 a jl QiF'" a j, Q j, e B represents a basic excution sequence 
corresponding to the program #=Qio!;ajl;Qi~!;...;ajr;Qj!. We now 
present a more concise description of the relevant parts of a model in terms 
of these basic execution sequences. 
DEFINITION 5. A set A_  B will be called a tree skeleton if aaQ e A 
implies also o-e A. A node aaQ will be called an a-son of a in the tree. 
(Note the similarity to the independently-defined skeletons of Kozen, 
1983.) 
A mapping f :  B --+ R + will be called a tree model if f (a)/> )ZQ~ ~,f(aaQ) 
for all a eB, a e//0. The tree skeleton supporting f is the set 
{(feB [ f (~)#0}.  
A tree model represents the part of a model emanating from a given 
state, collecting together states which cannot be distinguished by any 
program starting at the given state. The values f(~r) represent the frequen- 
cies Fr({#}true). This observation is formalized in the following lemmas; 
the first one shows that a tree model can be "blown-up" into a full-fledged 
model. 
LEMMA 6. To every tree model f and valuation V there correspond a dis- 
crete model X and a state v of ~/~ such that for all ~ ~ B, 
~/~, v~ {if) Fr(true) = f(o'). 
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Proof The measurable space for JV will be (B, 2B). Let N be the set of 
states of X ,  i.e., all finite positive measures on (B, 2s). For all p E ~b o define 
z(p)= {O, aaO l a= p, treB, Oe 9U, asHo}, 
i.e., sequences satisfying p are those which have p true at the end. For all 
a e Ho, and # e N define 
• p(a)(#)(O)= 0 for all Q e gt, 
• p(a)(p)(trbQ) =0 for all a ~ B, b ¢ a, Q ~ gt, and 
. . . .  • p(a)(p)(aaQ)=~'jt~ra~d) if f (a )¢O,  
=0 if f(~r) = 0. 
Since B is discrete, this defines a unique measure a(a)(p) on (B, 2B). 
Now let Y= (B, 2 B, z, p, V). In order to show that Jg" is a model 
according to the definition, p(a) must be shown to be linear and non- 
increasing. (Continuity is immediate, since the space is discrete.) Linearity 
is immediate from the definition, so we are left with showing that 
p(a)(#)(B) <<, #(B). The left-hand side is 
#(c°). f(coaQ )p(a)(#)(~r)= ~ p(a)(#)(o)aQ)= ~ f(co) 
o'eB o~eB oJ~B 
Qe ~ f(co)~O 
Q~ 
#(co) e~ f(o~aQ ) 
= ~B f(o9) 
f(co)v~O 
~< ~ #(c°)'f(¢o)= ~ #(~o)~<#(B). 
f(co) e)~B o)EB 
f(o)) ~ 0 
(The first inequality follows 
Definition 5.) 
Now define the state v by 
from 
f(rn) ~ 0 
the condition on tree models in 
v(Q) = f(Q), v(aaQ) = 0, 
for all Q E gt, a ~ Ho, and a e B. The lemma claims that 
~V', v~ {5} Fr(true) =f(a) ,  
or that p(#)(v)(B)-f(a). To show this we now prove by induction on the 
length of a that 
p(#)(v)(e)) =f(~r) if o) = a, 
=0 if co ¢ ~r. 
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. Base Case. a=Qe~P. Recall that p(Q!)=e~(e), and hence 
p(Q!)(v)(co) =0, unless co e z(Q). In the latter case, p(Q!)(v)((o)= v(co), and 
the result follows from the definition of v. 
• Inductive Step. (r = OaQ: 
p(OaQ)(v)(co)=p(Q!)(p(a)(p(O)(v)))((~)=O if coCz(Q), 
= z l  if co ~ z(Q). 
If coer(Q), the test Q! has no effect, and so 
z 1 = p(a)(p(O)(v))(co) =z2 
Z2 
=0 
p(O)(v)(O) f(~aQ) = 0 
f(O) 
~Z 3 
f(O) f(OaOl 
z3=f - -~ '_ ,  ~,  =f(a) .  
if (o = (mQ and f(~b) • O, 
otherwise; 
if qt ¢ 0 (ind. hyp.), 
if ~b--O; 
I 
DEFIYITIOY 7. A tree model f satisfies a formula P if there is some 
valuation V such that the model Y and state v derived from f and V 
satisfy P. 
LEMMA 8. The formula P is satisfiable if and only if it is satisfiable by 
some tree model. 
Proof Assume J[,  #~P,  where Jg = (D, ~4, z ~t, p~, V). Define f (a)  = 
p~(6)(I~)(D). The condition of Definition 5 is satisfied since 
f(~aQ)= ~ p~Z(~aQ)(y)(D)= ~ pJZ(Q!)(p~(R-8)(y))(D) 
Q~ Q~ Q~gt  
=(~p~(Q,))(p'U('#-5)(y))(D) (by linearity) 
=( ~ e¢(Q)) (p~t(-#-d)(y))(D)=p~(a)(p~(ff)(y))(D) 
\Q  E g~ 1 
<~ p"~(6)(tt)(D) (since p~(a) is non-increasing) 
=f(a) .  
Let Y = (B, 2 ~, zx, pX, V) and v be the model and state derived from f 
and V, as in the proof of Lemma 6. 
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By Lemma 6 we know that pW(6) (v ) (B)=f (a)=p~(6) (#) (D) ,  and
therefore ~/, #~ {6} Fr(true) = x if and only if Y ,  v~ {6} Fr(true) = x. 
Since every program c~ in P has a (unique) decomposition as a countable 
sum of basic execution sequences of B (cf. Lemma 11), and since (the 
meanings of) programs are linear, it follows that ~/ / , /~  {e} Fr(true) = x if 
and only if X ,  v~ {e} Fr(true)= x. This implies that J¢/, #~P if and only 
if X ,  v ~ P, as required. 
The other direction is immediate from Definition 7. I 
COROLLARY 9. Any satisfiable formula is satisfiable in a discrete model 
Note that this is not true in the first-order version PrDL (Feldman and 
Harel, 1982), where the formula 
Fr(true) = 1 /x Vv Fr(x = v) = 0 
is satisfiable but has no discrete model. 
The following lemma introduces a number of concepts which will be 
needed later: 
LEMMA 10. I f  A and B are regular sets then so are the following: 
• AoB={a l ' "ak ' "a ,  la l ' "ak~A,  ak ' "a ,  EB}, 
• A~=~+A+AoA+AoAoA+" ' ,  
• ext (A)=A(gt+Ho)  +.
We now represent every program 7 as a regular subset R(~) of B. This is 
done by induction on the structure of ~: 
• R(a) = ~a~P; R(SKIP) = ~; 
• fl) = R( )o R(f l ) ;  
• R(P!)=S~Q~,,Q=pQ; 
• R(if P then a else fl) = R(P!) o R(cQ + R(7  P!) o R(fl); 
. R(while P do ~)= (R(P!)oR(~))~'oR(-qP!). 
Checking that the definition of R(P!) is consistent with that of the while- 
loop defining it is straightforward. 
LEMMA 11. In every model J/Z, p(~) and Y,o~R(~)p(6) are identical as 
transformations on states. 
Proof By a straightforward induction on the structure of c~, using the 
linearity of p(~) and the fact that ~e~,p(Q! )= lM.  We omit the 
details. | 
Let Ri = R(~i), R = U7=1 Ri. 
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DEFINITION 12. Two tree models f and g will be called equivalent with 
respect o the formula P if Z~R~f(a)= Zo~R~ g(a) for i=  1,..., m. 
Intuitively, f and g are equivalent with respect o P if they cannot be 
distinguished by the programs appearing in P. 
LEMMA 13. I f  f and g are equivalent with respect to P then P is 
satisfiable in f if and only if it is satisfiable in g. 
Proof Assume that f and g are equivalent w.r.t. P and that f satisfies 
P with a valuation V. Let J/g and # (resp. Y and v) be the model and state 
derived from f (resp. g) and V. From the previous definition together with 
Lemma 11 and the definitions of J/g and X in the proof of Lemma 6 it 
follows that pJ~(~)(#) = pW(~i)(v) for all programs ~i in P. Since ~/ , / t~P  
by the assumption, it follows that Y ,  v~P,  which by definition implies 
that g satisfies P. | 
5.2. Signatures 
We now proceed to show that if P is satisfiable then it has a "finite" tree 
model with a computable structure. This is analogous to Fischer and Lad- 
ner's Small-Model Theorem for PDL (Fischer and Ladner, 1979). 
From now on we assume that P is satisfiable in the tree model f with 
valuation V. Our aim now is to construct an equivalent tree model g with 
only finitely many a for which g(a) ~ 0 (i.e., with finite support). We would 
like to pick a representative s quence out of every R~ and assign to it the 
total mass belonging to the program ~. This is impossible, however, since 
we also have to satisfy the condition on tree models in Definition 5, and so 
a deeper analysis is needed: we have to know for each sequence a which of 
its prefixes belong to other programs. The following lemma places a 
limitation on the possible interactions: 
LEMMA 14. I f  a e R(e) then no proper prefix of a can belong to R(e). 
Proof This is a direct consequence of the fact that programs are deter- 
ministic. The formal proof uses induction on the structure of e. | 
As a consequence of this lemma, if we label all prefixes of a with the 
indices of the programs they belong to, there can be no repetitions within a 
sequence. This motivates the following definition: Let S=2 {1 ....... t _  {~},  
L = {all sequences of disjoint elements from S}. 
DEFINITION 15. Call a sequence ~= (sl,..., st)  ~ L a signature of a ~ R if 
there is a sequence al ..... a t= a such that (1) each cr i is a proper prefix of 
ai+ 1, (2) ai ~ R; for all j e s ,  and (3) ~ is a maximal such sequence both in 
length and in size of component sets. 
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Clearly, each a tR  has a unique signature. For each ~tL  let 
C(¢)= {o-eR I ~ is the signature of a}. 
LEMMA 16. C(() is regular for all ~eL. 
Proof The proof proceeds by induction on the length of ~: 
• Base Case. C ( (s ) )=( - l~R i -5~i¢~Ri -ext (R) .  
Assume atC( (s ) ) .  Then atR i  for all i t s  by condition (2); aCR~ for 
all iCs by condition (3); and, again by condition (3), a has no proper 
prefixes in R, and so a ¢ ext(R). 
Assume now that a belongs to the right-hand side. We want to show that 
( s )  is the signature of a. The first condition is trivially satisfied, and the 
second is satisfied since by the assumption a t R~ for all i ts .  No longer 
sequence can exist, since a has no proper prefix in R, and s cannot be 
enlarged since ~r ¢ R~ for all i ~ s. Therefore all three conditions are satisfied 
and the claim is true. 
• Inductive Step. 
--i~Sn+l i~Sn+l 
- ext(ext(C((s~ ..... sn))) c~ R). 
Assume ~reC((sl ..... sn+1)). There must be a proper prefix e 'eR  of a 
with signature (Sl,...,Sn), and therefore ~reext(C((Sl,...,sn))). By con- 
dition (2), a t R i for all i t sn + 1, and by condition (3) a ~ R i for all i ~ sn + 1. 
The condition atext(ext(C((s l , . . . ,s , ) ) )~R) would mean that there is 
some proper prefix a" t R of a which has a proper prefix (which must be 
a') in C((sl ..... sn)), contradicting the maximality of the length of 
(sl,...,sn+l) for a. 
Assume now that ~r belongs to the right-hand side. Then a has a proper 
prefix a, with signature (s~ ..... sn); let a~ ..... an be the prefixes of a, 
specified in Definition 15, and let an+l=a.  Conditions (1) and (2) are 
satisfied by induction for al,...,o- ~ and by the assumption for an+ ~. If 
(Sl,..., s ,+~) were not maximal for a, the fault must come after a,,  since 
(sl,..., sn) is guaranteed to be maximal for an. The last set S,+l cannot be 
enlarged since a ~ R i for all i 6 S,+l. Assume that there is a (nonempty) set 
s' such that (s~,..., sn, s', sn+~) satisfies (at least) conditions (1) and (2). 
Then there must be a proper prefix a' ~ R of a which is also a proper suffix 
of an ; this means that a' t A = def ext(C((Sl ..... s n))) ~ R, contradicting the 
fact that aCext(A). Therefore condition (3) is also satisfied and 
~tC((Sl,...,sn+l)). I 
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5.3. A Special Case 
At this point we are ready to complete the proof for the special case 
where Ho contains a single atomic program a. We abstract further from the 
countable tree models into the finite schematic models (see Fig. 1). 
The following definitions are special cases of the more general definitions 
given later. A tree skeleton will be represented by a schematic skeleton, 
which is simply the set of all signatures of nodes in the tree. This set is 
obviously finite. A schematic model is a valuation ~0: L~ FI + satisfying 
(]?( ( S1 ..... Sn ) ) ~ ~s  (V9( Sl ..... Sn, S) ) .  A schemat ic  mode l  ~0 wil l  be said to 
represent a tree model f if Z~c(: l f (a)  = q~(~) for all ~ E L. A consequence 
of this definition is that if (p represents both f and g then f and g are 
equivalent, since 
E f (a ) -  E E f(o-)= E cp(~_), 
aeRi ~eL ¢~C(~) ~L  
i ~ last(~) i ~ last(~) 
where last((s 1 ..... s , ) )=s , ,  and the same holds for g. 
We now want to show that every schematic model represents some tree 
model, so that from now on we can deal solely with schematic models. 
Assume, therefore, that ~0 is a given schematic model with supporting 
schematic skeleton f2 which represents the tree skeleton A. For each ~ ~ so2 
Probabillstle Program 
Models Structures 
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Theoretic Model 
Countable 
Representation 
Finite 
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V 
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Skeleton 
i 
Schematic 
Skeleton 
FIG. 1. Levels of abstraction. 
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choose some a eC(~)c~A, and close the resulting set under the prefix 
operation. Repeat the following steps for all chosen strings, in decreasing 
order of their lengths: Distribute the weight ~0(~) between the chosen 
aeC(~),  and "filter" the weights downwards by setting f (a )= 
~Q ~ ef(aaQ). The weights filtered down in this way will never exceed q~(~') 
for any subsequent ~' since by definition q~(~')~>Z,~o(~'. (s)) .  (The • 
operation denotes concatenation of sequences.) The excess is again 
arbitrarily distributed between the appropriate nodes. This clearly results in 
an equivalent tree model. 
The schematic skeleton O representing the tree skeleton derived from the 
given formula P is recursive, since ~ ~ g2 if and only if C(~)~ R ¢ ~,  and 
both sets are regular. All that is left to do is to check whether there is some 
schematic model on f2 which will satisfy P. This is done by constructing a 
formula ¢ of first-order eal-number theory which is true if and only if 
there is such a schematic model. For each ~ E £2 create a new variable x~, 
and let ¢~ be A~- xe >~ w e. <s> if ~ is a non-leaf and x¢ ~> 0 otherwise. Let P' 
be the formula P with every subformula {c~i} Fr(true)=y replaced by 
~i~las,(~) x~ = y. By the assumption on P made at the beginning of this sec- 
tion, P' is now a formula of first-order eal-number theory. Let ¢ be the 
existential closure of the formula Ae~a ¢~ i P'. It is easy to check that ¢ 
satisfies the required condition. This concludes the proof for this special 
case. 
5.4. Finite Representations--Schematic Models 
The general proof follows along the same lines of the proof given in the 
previous ection, but the details are more complicated ue to the fact that 
in the presence of more than one atomic program probabilities are no 
longer additive at every node of the tree skeleton. In this case there are two 
distinct types of junctions in the tree: 
DEFINITION 17. Two different sequences are said to have a max-junction 
if their longest common prefix ends with an atom Q e 7', and a plus- 
junction if it ends with a program a e H0, or if it is empty. 
While at plus-junctions mass 
maximum is taken. The intuition 
have a plus-junction represent 
is additive, at max-junctions only the 
behind this fact is that sequences which 
different cases, possibly of the same 
program, since they split at a test; whereas a max-junction signifies two dif- 
ferent actions (i.e., executing two different programs) for the same case. 
We need a further abstraction of tree models and tree skeletons, ignoring 
all intermediate states which do not belong to any program, and retaining 
only information about signatures and their relationships. This is a 
generalization of the restricted efinition given earlier: 
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DEFINITION 18. A schematic skeleton is an oriented (unordered) tree 
with two types of nodes, called max nodes and plus nodes, and 
corresponding to max-junctions and plus-junctions, respectively. A max 
node in the tree may be labeled with a set of indices (an element of S) with 
the following restrictions: an unlabeled max node must have at least two 
sons (of either type); a plus node can only have max nodes for sons, and 
must also have at least two sons. In addition, the labels on a schematic 
skeleton must satisfy the following three conditions: 
(1) all labels on a single path must be disjoint; 
(2) all labeled sons of the same plus node must have different labels; 
(3) the sets of indices in subtrees rooted at different sons of the same 
max node must be disjoint. 
A schematic model is a schematic skeleton with a labeling ¢p from the 
nodes into the non-negative r al numbers atisfying: 
(1) if v is a plus node with sons ut,..., uj then ~0(v)=Z{=l ~0(ui); 
(2) if v is a max nodes with sons u~ ..... uj then ~0(v) ~> max1 ~i~ q~(ui). 
The limitations on the labels of schematic skeletons correspond to 
properties of tree skeletons: condition (1) is given by Lemma 14, and con- 
dition (3) by the following: 
LEMMA 19. I f  O and 0 are two sequences having a max-junction and 
o ~ R(~) then 0 (~ R(~). 
Proof This, again, is a direct consequence of the fact that programs are 
deterministic. The formal proof uses induction on the structure of ~. | 
Similarly, the restrictions on schematic models correspond to the restric- 
tions on tree models. We now proceed to formalize the correspondence. 
First, let mj(A) and pj(A) for some A ~ B be the sets of all max-junctions 
or plus-junctions, respectively, of strings in A. 
DEFINITION 20. A schematic skeleton £2 represents the tree skeleton 
generated by the set R if there is a mapping from Rw mj(R) onto the max 
nodes of £2 and from pj(R) onto the plus nodes of £2 which preserves the 
structure in the sense that every path in R is mapped to a path in f2 labeled 
by its signature, and the junction of any two strings in R is mapped to a 
node in the correct relative positions in the images of the two strings. 
Figures 2 and 3 give an example of the above definitions for the three 
programs: 
~1: while p do (a; if p then a else b), 
~2: while p do (a;a), 
~3: while p do (a;b). 
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FIG. 2. A tree skeleton: < = plus junction; g = max junction. 
A tree model. Squares are max nodes, circles are plus nodes. Fro. 3. 
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Figure 2 is a graph which, when expanded to a tree, is the tree skeleton 
generated by the above programs; nodes which are not on any path of R 
are not represented. Figure 3 is the schematic skeleton representing the tree 
skeleton of Fig. 2. 
LEMMA 21. Every tree skeleton is represented by some schematic 
skeleton. 
Proof The proof proceeds by induction on the greatest number of max- 
junctions along any path in the tree (by Lemma 19 this number cannot 
exceed m). If there are no max-junctions at all, the schematic skeleton is 
simply the tree generated from the signatures of the paths in the tree 
skeleton, considered as sequences of labeled max nodes, by identifying 
common initial prefixes and adding plus nodes at every non-trivial intersec- 
tion. 
If the tree skeleton does have max-junctions, we know by the induction 
hypothesis that those parts of the tree skeleton above the first max-junction 
on any path have representations a schematic skeletons. The required 
schematic skeleton is then generated by combining those representations as 
subtrees of max nodes on top of the initial part of each path until the max- 
junction, and combining the resulting trees as before. I 
We now extend the correspondence to the weighted case. 
DEFINITION 22. A schematic model ~0 represents a tree model f if the 
schematic skeleton f2 underlying q~ represents the tree skeleton supporting 
f, and if Z~R,f(a)=Z~o(s), where the second sum is taken over all 
labeled nodes s in £2 for which i e s. 
An immediate consequence of this definition is that if the schematic 
model q) represents two tree models f and g, these must be equivalent as 
tree models, and by Lemma 13, if P is satisfiable in either of them it is 
satisfiable in both. Therefore we can unambiguously define q) to satisfy P if 
any (equivalently, each) tree model represented by q~ satisfies P. (It is easy 
to see that there is always at least one tree model which q) represents.) 
LEMMA 23. Every tree model is represented bysome schematic model 
Proof Given a tree model f with support A, let f2 be the schematic 
skeleton representing A. We define a labeling q) on (2 by assigning the 
weights of all strings mapped to a given node to that node. For this pur- 
pose we consider a plus-junction ~a to have weight f(cra)= Zo_~ ef(aaQ), 
which implies that f(a)/> maxa~nof(aa). This together with the fact that 
the mapping between A and (2 is structure-preserving and onto now 
implies that ~0 is indeed a schematic model. To illustrate this, assume that v 
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is a max node with sons u, w; assume further that max-junctions 0i are 
mapped to v, each with descendants ai and z; mapped to u and w, respec- 
tively. In that case q~(v) = Y. f(Oi) >1 Y. max(f(ai), f(ve)) ~> max(Y~ f(a~), 
5~f(z~))=max(~o(u),q~(w)). Since the mapping takes any node to its 
signature, it is clear that ~0 represents f I 
LEMMA 24. I f  a schematic skeleton £2 represents a tree skeleton A then 
any schematic model on £2 represents ome tree model with support included 
inA. 
Proof Assume that ~o is some schematic model on £2. We wish to define 
a tree model f on A which will be represented by q~. The construction of f 
will also define values for plus-junctions aa in such a way that f (ae)= 
Ze~ ~f(aaQ) and f(a)~maxa~uof(aa), which immediately implies that 
f(a) >~ maxa~n0 Zo~ ~,f(aaQ), as needed. The following steps are repeated 
for all nodes v in £2 in postorder, i.e., from the leaves to the root (cf. Knuth, 
1968, p. 334). At this point, some strings of d mapped to v by the 
correspondence b tween d and £2 may already have been given a value, but 
the sum of all those values is not greater than ~0(v). Divide the remaining 
mass q~(v) arbitrarily among the strings mapped to v. "Filter" the mass 
downward in f by setting f (aa)~-~,o~f (aaQ)  and f(a)~- 
maxa~nof(aa), again in postorder, until reaching a string in A c~R or a 
junction of strings from that set. The process continues in this way until 
reaching the root. The reason we could claim at each stage that the total 
mass allocated to f(co) for co mapped to v does not exceed ~0(v) is that the 
mass filtered down is the least possible and so is equal to ~2 ~o(ui) or 
max ~o(ui) for the sons ui of v depending on whether v is a plus or max 
node, respectively. The conditions on (p ensure that ~o(v) is not less than the 
above amount. As in the previous lemma, it is clear that ~0 represents f I 
Summing up our results so far, we find that satisfiability of P is 
equivalent (by Lemma 8) to satisfiability in tree models. This, in turn, is 
equivalent (by Lemma 24) to satisfiability in some schematic model that is 
supported by the schematic skeleton representing the tree skeleton 
generated by cq,...,em. (See Fig. 1.) It remains to be shown that this 
schematic skeleton can be computed effectively from the programs 
cq,..., c~ m. This is done by building for each program c~ a (deterministic) 
finite automaton A i accepting the basic execution sequences belonging to 
Ri. Next, the (deterministic) product automaton is built in the standard 
way, and each state (q~,..., qn) is labeled with the indices i for which qi is an 
accepting state of Az. No essential state of this automaton can have out- 
going edges labeled 'both with programs and with atoms (tests), since 
otherwise it might accept strings which are not in B= (gtHo)* ~. (An essen- 
tial state is one reachable from the initial state and from which a path 
643/63/1/2-3 
32 YISHAI A. FELDMAN 
exists to an accepting state.) Therefore ach state can unambiguously be 
defined to be a max node or a plus node. 
The product automaton is then expanded into a tree with back edges. In 
this tree no state which has a non-empty label can be on any cycle, since 
that would contradict Lemma 14. Therefore all back edges can be deleted, 
and the resulting tree contracted into a schematic skeleton by deleting 
irrelevant states and repeatedly combining any siblings with isomorphic 
subtrees. (Note that this provides an alternative proof for Lemma 21.) 
Having found the schematic skeleton representing the programs in the 
formula, we have to see if it can be made into a schematic model satisfying 
P. This is done by building a sentence of first-order eal-number theory 
which is true if and only if such a schematic model can be constructed, and 
by Tarski's (1948) classic result, the truth of this sentence can be effectively 
checked. 
LEMMA 25. Given a schematic skeleton £2 representing the programs in 
P, it is possible to construct a sentence ~ of first-order real-number theory 
which is true if and only if there is some assignment of weights to £2 which 
will make it into a schematic model satisfying P. 
Proof Create a new (real-valued) variable xv for every node v eO. 
(Recall that £2 is finite.) Define a formula ~v according to the type of v: 
• if v is a plus node with sons ul,..., uj, let Ov be xv = Y,{= 1 xui; 
• if v is a max node with sons u~,..., uj, let ~b~ be A J= 1 x~ >~ x, ;  
• if v is a leaf, let O~bexv>~0. 
Let P' be the formula P with every subformula {c~i} Fr(true) = y replaced 
by Zi~vx~=y,  and let ~ be the existential closure of the formula 
/~e ~ A P'. It is now easy to check that ~ satisfies the condition of the 
lemma. | 
We have now completed the proof of the main result: 
THEOREM 26 (Decidability of P-PrDL). The satisfiability (and hence 
validity) problem for P-PrDL is decidable. 
5.5. Complexity 
An immediate lower bound on the complexity of the decision procedure 
for P-PrDL is the exponential-space lower bound for first-order eal-num- 
ber theory (Ben-Or, Kozen, and Reif, 1984), which is a sublanguage of 
P-PrDL. The decision procedure described above requires, in the worst 
case, triple-exponential space, since the product automaton might have 
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exponential size, 1 and the tree generated from it might add another 
exponential; thus the formula ~ constructed in Lemma 25 above might 
have double-exponential size, and yet another exponential is required by 
the decision procedure of (Ben-Or et al., 1984) to check whether ~p is true 
or not. However, this upper bound can be improved to a double-exponen- 
tial-space bound, by replacing ~ by a single-exponential-size formula 0'. 
THEOREM 27. The validity problem for P-PrDL is decidable in double- 
exponential space. 
Proof. First, we must examine in more detail the procedure for trans- 
forming the product automaton i to a tree with back edges. A depth-first 
search (DFS) is first performed on the automaton, starting with the initial 
state. This results in the original states of the automaton re-arranged to 
form a tree with back edges, forward edges ("fronds"), and cross edges (see 
Aho, Hopcroft, and Ullman, 1974, pp. 187-189). The branches of this tree 
can be ordered in such a way that all cross edges point in the same direc- 
tion. The root of the tree is the initial state. Cross edges are then 
eliminated, by making a new copy of the subtree they point to, thus mak- 
ing them into tree edges. (It is always possible to find a cross edge pointing 
to a tree without further cross edges, by the above-mentioned property.) 
Finally, fronds are similarly eliminated, and the result is a tree with back 
edges only. 
From the above description it is clear that only back edges in the DFS 
graph are transformed into back edges in the final tree, and that they 
account for all such back edges. Since we have seen that back edges in the 
resulting tree can be deleted, the same must be true for the DFS graph, 
which now becomes a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In order to use this 
DAG as the skeleton for a model, it must be further refined. Each node 
should be subdivided into subnodes, one for each incoming edge. The 
weight assigned to a node should exactly equal the sum of the weights of its 
subnodes, and should be equal to the sum or greater than or equal to the 
maximum of the weights of the subnodes it points to, depending on 
whether it is a plus node or a max node, respectively. 
We now claim that such an assignment of non-negative weights to the 
DAG is possible if and only if there is a corresponding assignment to the 
expanded tree. First, assume that there is a proper assignment ofweights to 
the DAG. The process of eliminating non-tree dges can be carried out as 
before; when a subtree is copied, the weights should be distributed in 
proportion to the weight of the subnode pointed to by the edge causing the 
1 Any formula can be transformed into an equivalent formula in standard form, no more 
than squaring its size, and therefore the assumption that the formula is in standard form 
entails no loss of generality. 
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split, relative to the total weight of the other subnodes. This clearly conser- 
ves any plus of max conditions, and therefore creates a tree with a proper 
assignment of weights. 
Assume now that a tree with a weighting function f is given. Every node 
in the tree can be unambiguously mapped to a DAG subnode, since the 
(single) edge from its parent to it has a unique corresponding edge in the 
DAG. The mapping also preserves the type of nodes (plus or max). It is 
now possible to define for every DAG node u a weight qo(u) to be the sum 
of f(v) for all tree nodes v mapped to u. To see that this assignment is 
proper, observe that any tree node v (~) mapped to a DAG node u has 
exactly one son vJ. i/in each DAG subnode uj pointed to by an edge from u, 
and these v~0's are the only tree nodes mapped to uj. Since in the tree we 
have f(v (i)) = Y~jf(v~/)) for plus nodes and f(v ~i)) >~maxjf(v} i)) for max 
nodes, it follows that 
Zf ( , ' " )  = Z Z f(,J") = Z Z f(#") = Y 
i i ,j j i ,j 
if u is a plus node, and 
qo(u) = ~. f(v ~i~) >t y, max f(v~ i,) >/max ~, f(v} i)) = max q0(uj) 
i i ] J i J 
if u is a max node. 
Having established the fact that the formula P is satisfiable if and only if 
it is satisfied by an assignment o the subnodes of the DAG, we can 
proceed to build the formula 0' describing this assignment. Create a new 
variable xu for every DAG node or subnode u. For every node u consisting 
of subnodes ul,...,ut, let i/s, be the formula xu=Yl=lx,, .  If u has sons 
vl,..., vj (these are subnodes), let 0', be the formula xu = y'x.= 1 xv, if u is a 
plus node, and/~x= 1 xu >~ x~, if u is a max node. If u is a leaf, define ~s', to be 
simply x, ~> 0. The required formula 0' is now the existential closure of the 
formula/~,(~,  A ~S',) /x P', where P' is defined as in Lemma 25 above. 
The DAG has as many subnodes as edges, and this number is exponen- 
tial in the size of P. The formula ip' therefore has a (single) exponential 
size, and only double-exponential space is needed in order to determine its 
truth. This establishes the double-exponential-space upper bound on the 
complexity of the decision procedure for P-PrDL. | 
5.6. The Inference Problem 
We close the technical part of this paper with a negative result: 
THEOREM 28. The inference problem for P-PrDL is H]-hard. 
Proof Inference problems come in two flavors: (1) F~P if and only if 
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JCL-validity of the formulas in F implies J//-validity of P for every model 
J/g; and (2) F~P if and only if the truth of all formulas of F in any state/~ 
implies the truth of P in ¢. We deal with the first case, and indicate the 
modifications necessary for the second. 
We show that a certain recurring domino problem (see Harel, 1984) is 
reducible to the non-inference problem of P-PrDL. The problem is: 
Given a set T of dominoes; can T tile the positive quadrant G + so that 
domino do occurs in the tiling infinitely often in the first column? (9) 
This is problem R2 of Harel (1984) and is shown there to be Zl-complete. 
Adopting the terminology of Harel (1984), we assume an input set 
T= {do,..., din} involving colors C= {Co,..., ck-1} where without loss of 
generality k is a power of 2. Let Ho= {a, b}, and qs0= {det, fin, righti, 
lefti, ups, down/I 1 ~<i~<logk}. We use the meta-variable "dir" ro range 
over {right, left, up, down}; "Dir" will be the corresponding name with a 
capital. The notation [i]j will stand for the jth bit of the number i. The 
indices of the colors on domino d~ will be right(d~), left(d~), etc. 
We define the event 
logk 
Di: A A diri = [dir(di)]j, 
dir j = 1 
where dirj = 1 means simply dirj itself and dirj = 0 means -n dirj, and the 
formulas 
Det: Fr(true) = 1 A Fr(det)= 1 
A (Fr(fin)= 0 v Fr(f in)= 1) A ~/ Fr(D~)= 1 
l--1 
and 
logk 
Dir/: A Fr(dir j)= [i] j ,  
j= l  
for Dire { Right, Left, Up, Down }. 
Let the set F contain all instantiations of the scheme 
{ab}Q - {ba}Q (10) 
and the formulas 
DetD({a} Det A {b} Det) 
Det A Right,~ {a} Left,, Det A Up,~ {b} Down, 
Det ~ (Fr(fin) = 1 - {while -TDo do b} Fr(true) = 1), 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
36 YISHAI A. FELDMAN 
and let P be the formula 
Det= {while fin do b} Fr(true) = 1. 
We now claim that F~ P if and only if there is no recurrent tiling of the 
kind described in (9). Assume first that there is no solution to (9), and 
assume that a model JOg satisfies F and that a state # of J¢ satisfies Det. By 
(11) we know that (aibJ)(#)~Det for all i, j. This ensures that at each of 
these states there is a unique l for which Fr(Dt) = 1. By (10) these states 
encode a grid, and so we can define a tiling by putting at square (i, j) of the 
grid the domino dt for which #~ {aib j} Fr(DI) = 1. Formulas (12) ensure 
that this is indeed a proper tiling. 
Formula (13) now implies that Fr(fin)= 1 is satisfied by a state of the 
grid if and only if do appears omewhere above it, since otherwise the while 
loop will never terminate. However, by the assumption do appears only a 
finite number of times in the first column, and so there must be a state in 
that column where Fr(fin)= 0. This implies that the while loop in P will 
eventually terminate, and therefore #~P,  as required. 
Assume now that F~P,  and assume we are given a tiling of G + by T. It 
is easy to build a tree model satisfying F and representing the given tiling. 
By reasoning similar to the previous case we can show that in this tiling do 
appears only a finite number of times in the first column. 
The only modification eeded for the second type of inference problems 
is to prefix all formulas in F by all combinations of {aibJ}, thus forcing 
them to the true at all states reachable from/~ by a and b. | 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a propositional logic for probabilistic programs, 
which is a decidable abstraction from the very powerful but highly 
undecidable PrDL of Feldman and Harel (1982), Feldman (1984). This 
enables studying some essential attributes of probabilistic programs in 
isolation from the more complicated issues of first-order programs. It still 
has direct applicability to the general case, since by fixing the meanings of 
some predicates and programs to be the atomic formulas and programs of 
P-PrDL, every model of PrDL defines a model of P-PrDL. The decision 
procedure presented establishes a double-exponential-space upper-bound 
on the complexity of validity in P-PrDL. 
In Feldman (1984), several logics with expressive power between that of 
PrDL and P-PrDL are investigated; all are seen to be undecidable or 
otherwise inadequate. Thus, it seems that P-PrDL is the strongest 
decidable version of PrDL possible. Note that although P-PrDL was 
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developed as a restriction of PrDL, 2 by a simple extension of notation it 
becomes very much like a probabilistic PDL, such as Kozen's (1983) 
PPDL. 
The decidability proof for P-PrDL introduced a succession of 
refinements of the notion of a general measure-theoretical model, through 
tree models, down to schematic models, which we feel are an important 
concise description of a propositional probabilistic model. This feeling is 
reinforced by the independent use of tree models (and their supporting tree 
skeletons) in Kozen (1983). 
This work poses some interesting questions. First, we can ask whether 
there is a simple axiomatization of P-PrDL. Next, we may look for tighter 
bounds on the complexity of the decision precedure for P-PrDL. Finally 
we comment hat our proof is highly dependent on the fact that programs 
are regular, and we can ask what is the case with other classes of programs, 
in analogy with the work of Harel, Pnueli, and Stavi (1983) and Harel and 
Paterson (1984) for PDL. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am grateful to D. Harel for his help and encouragement, and to D. Kozen, A. Pnueli, and 
J. Reif for helpful discussions. 
RECEIVED: November 15, 1983; ACCEPTED: January 22, 1985 
REFERENCES 
AHO, A. V., HOPCROFT, J. E., AND ULLMAN, J. D. (1974), "The Design and Analysis of Com- 
puter Algorithms," Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 
BEN-OR, M., KozrN, D., AND REIF J. (1984), The complexity of elementary algebra and 
geometry, in "16th ACM Sympos. on Theory of Computing," pp. 457-464. 
FELDMAN, Y. A. (1984), "Probabilistic Programming Logics," Ph. D. thesis, The Weizmann 
Institute of Science. 
FELDMAN, Y. A., AND HAREL, D. (1982), A probabilistic dynamic logic, in "14th ACM Sym- 
pos. on Theory of Computing," pp. 181-195; J. Comput. System Sci. 28, No. 2 (1984), 
193-215. 
FISCHER, M. J., AND LADNER, R. E. (1979), Propositional dynamic logic of regular programs, 
J. Comput. System Sci. 18, No. 2. 
HAREL, D. (1984), A simple highly undecidable domino problem (or, a lemma on infinite trees 
with applications), in "Proc. Conf. Logic and Computation," Clayton, Victoria, Australia, 
January. 
HAREL, D., AND PATERSON M. S. (1984), Undecidability of PDL with L= {a2~l i~>0}, J. 
Comput. System Sei. 29, 359-365. 
Hence the name P-PrDL rather than PrPDL. 
38 YISHAI A. FELDMAN 
HAREL, D., PNUELI, A., AND STAVI, J. (1983), Proposititional dynamic logic of nonregular 
programs, J. Comput. System Sci. 26, No. 2, 222-243. 
HALPERN, J. Y., AND REIF, J. H. (1981), The propositional dynamic logic of deterministic, 
well-structured programs, in "22nd IEEE Sympos. on Foundations of Computer Science." 
HART, S., AND SHARIR, M. (1983), Probabilistic propositional temporal logics, manuscript, 
June. 
KNUTH, D. E. (1968), "The Art of Computer Programming: Fundamental Algorithms", 
Vol. 1; Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 
KOZEN, D. (1979), Semantics of probabilistic programs, in "20th IEEE Sympos. on Foun- 
dations of Computer Science," pp. 101-114; J. Comput. System Sci. 22 (1981), 328-350. 
KOZEN, D. (1983), A probabilistic PDL, in "15th ACM Sympos. on Theory of Computing." 
LEHMANN, D., AND SHELAtt, S. (1983), Reasoning with time and chance, Inform. and Control 
53, No. 3, 165-198. 
MAKOWSKY, J. A., AND TIOMKIN, M. L. (1983), Probabilistic propositional dynamic logic, 
manuscript, August. 
RaMSHAW, L. H. (1981), "Formalizing the Analysis of Algorithms," Ph.D. thesis, Stanford 
University; Technical Report XEROX PARC, 1981. 
REIF, J. H. (1980), Logics for probabilistic programming, in "12th ACM Sympos. on Theory 
of Computing." 
ROGERS, H. (1967), "Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability," 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
TARSKI, A. (1948), "A Decision Method for Elementary Algebra and Geometry," Rand Corp. 
